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I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of fair use is one of the most widely-discussed1
* Matthew W. Wallace is an associate at the law firm of Taulbee, Rushing & Bunce,
Statesboro, Georgia; B.A., cum laude, 1986, University of Texas at Arlington; M.A. 1987,
Vanderbilt University; J.D., cum laude, 1991, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer Uni-
versity. This Article was honored with a Second Place Award in the Los Angeles County Bar
Association Intellectual Writing Competition. A slightly shorter version of this Article won
first place in the Mercer University, Nathan Burkhan Memorial Writing Competition, spon-
sored by the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP).
1. See, e.g., NEIL BooRSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 5.2 (1981 & Supp. 1988); PAUL GOLD-
STEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 10 (1989); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (1985); 2A THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., EN-
TERTAINMENT LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES § 25.07 (1990); Zechariah
Chafee Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (1945); Jay Dratler
Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233
(1988); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1659 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982);
Timothy Kevane, Fair Use in Jackson v. MPI Home Video: Why Bother?, 10 Loy. ENT. L.
J. 595 (1990); Newman, Not the End of History: The Second Circuit Struggles with Fair
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and hotly debated2 areas of copyright law. This is not surprising,
because it is "an equitable rule of reason"' without precise bound-
aries, rather than a bright line rule of law. Given the fact that it is
an equitable, rather than a legal, doctrine, "fair use" will always
defy precise definition by statute or analysis." Many unsuccessful
attempts have been made to define the doctrine.5 The most widely
accepted definition is that fair use is "a privilege in others than the
owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasona-
ble manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly
granted to the owner by the copyright."6 This definition on its face
is of little practical utility, and the courts' treatment of fair use is
diverse, confusing, and often contradictory.
7
The Supreme Court has had enormous difficulty defining the
concept,8 which has resulted in contradictory opinions. In 1984, the
Court first wrestled with fair use,9 and, over a strident dissent,
Use, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y I (1990). See also WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN
COPYRIGHT LAW (1985); LEON E. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT (1978);
James L. Oakes, Copyrights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injunctions, 18 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 983 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1990), and Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1137 (1990), for the debate between Judge Leval and Professor Weinreb.
3. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984).
4. See Weinreb, supra note 2, at 1161. Professor Weinreb suggests that the fluid defi-
nition of fair use is an advantage:
The reference to fairness in the doctrine of fair use imparts to the copyright
scheme a bounded normative element that is desirable in itself. It gives effect to
the community's established practices and understandings and allows the loca-
tion of copyright within the framework of property generally. Adjudication ac-
cording to a standard of fairness calls for the exercise of great judicial skill, or
art.
See also Sony, 464 U.S. at 448 n.31.
5. One observer attempted to define a fair use as one "technically forbidden by the
law, but allowed as reasonable and customary on the theory that the author must have
foreseen it and tacitly consented to it." RICHARD C. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT
LAW 143 (1925). However, this definition is inconsistent with the practical application of the
doctrine because many uses considered "fair" are expressly rejected by the copyright holder.
Compare Towle v. Ross, 32 F. Supp. 125, 127 (D. Or. 1940) (there is no fair or non-compet-
ing use of copyright material unless by consent) (footnote omitted) with Elsmere Music, Inc.
v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd per curiam, 623 F.2d
252 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to prohibit parody of "I Love New York"
jingle, because Saturday Night Live version acerbicly attacked the slick pro New York
advertising).
6. H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944).
7. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977) (fair use "cannot be
determined by resort to any arbitrary rules or fixed criteria."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978).
8. See Dratler, supra note 1, at 260.
9. Before 1984, the Supreme Court had twice affirmed fair use rulings without com-
[Vol. 9:121
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held that the wholesale public copying of television programs for
later viewing represented a fair use. 10 However, less than a year
later, the same Court held that a magazine's use of just 300 words
from an unpublished 200,000-word manuscript was an impermissi-
ble infringement of the author's copyright." These sharply-divided
opinions, 2 with badly articulated rationales,'" have offered little
guidance to lower courts 4 and none at all to the lawyer.
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it attempts to ac-
quaint the lay practitioner 15 with the intricacies of the fair use de-
fense in various factual situations.' 6 Second, it presents a novel ap-
proach to pleading fair use issues.' 7 To accomplish this goal, it has
been divided into three sections.'8 Part II begins with an historical
analysis of the fair use doctrine, carefully examining the proce-
dural ramifications of invoking the fair use defense. Part III is a
detailed analysis of the fair use statute." Part IV analyzes the dif-
ferent factual paradigms, which courts have created in applying
ment in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd without
opinion, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), and Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd
without opinion sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43
(1958).
10. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). This deci-
sion inspired reams of negative comment. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 1, at 261-88; Fisher,
supra note 1, at 1667-95. The practical utility of the decision has also inspired defenders.
See Weinreb, supra note 2, at 1155 ("The overwhelming fact, of which everyone was aware,
is that time-shifting [viewing a prior taped program] had become for the public as well as
the programmers an ordinary, proper activity. The millions of viewers who taped shows for
later viewing had not the least sense that they were doing anything that was forbidden or
improper.").
11. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). This
decision, also sharply divided, has inspired its share of negative comment. See, e.g., Dratler,
supra note 1, at 270-76.
12. Sony was a 5-4 decision with Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist
dissenting. Nation Enterprises was decided by a 6-3 vote with Justices Brennan, White, and
Marshall dissenting.
13. See Weinreb, supra note 2, at 1153-54 ("Justice Stevens' arguments in favor of fair
use . . . are hopelessly inadequate.").
14. Compare Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F.
Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (defendant's use of copy of T.V. Guide for an advertising com-
parison was not a fair use) with Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal
Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983) (concluding that it was fair use for defendant to quote
from Consumer's Union's favorable report of defendant's product).
15. This includes any lawyer who is attempting to untangle the Gordian knot of the
fair use doctrine for the first time.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 181-395.
17. For an in-depth discussion of techniques utilized to support the numbers quoted
herein, see the Appendix.
18. See discussion infra parts IIA, IIIA.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). See infra text accompanying note 34.
1992]
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the fair use defense.2 °
II. THE FAIR USE DEFENSE
A. Historical Roots
In 1709, the English Parliament created the Statute of Anne
in order to limit to a term of years the formerly perpetual rights
held by publishers of books and sheet music.2' Several decades
later, the first judicial declaration of the doctrine of fair use was
made in Gyles v. Wilcox. 22 In Gyles, the court held that an
abridgement of a longer work represented a fair use.2 s
Following the American Revolution, the newly-minted United
States incorporated much of English common law into its legal sys-
tem,24 which included English notions of copyright.25 The first
American judicial recognition of the fair use doctrine is found in
two early American opinions drafted by Justice Story.26 In Folsom
v. Marsh,27 Justice Story laid out the basis of what was to become
the American.fair use defense, noting that:
[W]e must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the ob-
jects, of the original work.
2
1
Subsequent courts adopted Story's broad analysis.29 Indeed, courts
continue to cite him with approval today.30
Over the next 125 years, courts continued to wrestle with fair
20. See infra text accompanying notes 181-395.
21. 12 Anne ch. 19 (1709); Patry, supra note 1, at 6-17.
22. 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (1740).
23. Id. at 490.
24. This is especially true in light of Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841).
25. Fair use can be fairly read into the Constitution's grant of copyright powers to
Congress: "Congress shall have power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries; .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. Two years before the acclaimed Folsom opinion, 9 F. Cass. 342 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841), Story considered the protection to be given compilations of notes in a Latin grammar
in Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839).
27. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
28. Id. at 348.
29. See, e.g., Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 207 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1853) (The German
translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin did not infringe author's rights because defendant did not
use the same "language in which the conceptions of the author are clothed.").
30. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 550
(1985). But see Goldstein, supra note 1, at § 10.1 n.5.
[Vol. 9:121
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use. Judges complained that the "doctrine is entirely equitable and
is so flexible as virtually to defy definition."' In 1955, as part of a
wholesale revision of the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress began stud-
ying the doctrine,32 which was eventually codified in section 107 of
the 1976 Copyright Act.3  Section 107 states as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.3
4
The first sentence of section 107 lists the following six uses
that may bring the unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted
work within its protection: "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching . . . scholarship or research."3 5 This laundry list served to
codify several longstanding applications of the fair use defense."6
The second part of this section, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1-4), sets out four
31. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
32. The best congressional study is Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works,
Copyright Study No. 14, 86 Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1960). The Legislative fact find-
ing leading up to the 1976 bill is well described in PATRY, supra note 1, at 213-319.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5659 [hereinafter House Report] (fair use is "given
express statutory recognition for the first time in section 107").
34. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
35. Id. The House Report, supra note 33, also includes some specific examples: "quo-
tation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, for illustration or clarification of
the author's observations; use in a parody of some of the content of the work parodied;...
reproduction by a teacher or a student of a small part of a work to illustrate a lesson;...
incidental and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located in the
scene of an event being reported." Id. at 65.
36. Parody, for example, has long enjoyed protection under the fair use exception. See,
e.g., Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822
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nonexclusive factors to be used to determine whether a particular
use of a copyrighted work is "fair. ' 37 These factors, which echo
Justice Story's opinion in Folsom, 8 had been frequently discussed
in case law immediately prior to the 1976 Act, 9 and reflect Con-
gressional intent to codify the doctrine as it then existed, without
enlarging or contracting its scope.4 ° The House Report states as
follows:
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of
circumstances that can rise [sic] in particular cases precludes
the formulation of exact rules in the statute. The bill endorses
the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use,
but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute,
especially during a period of rapid technological change. Beyond
a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some
of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt
the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis. Sec-
tion 107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of
fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.
41
Empirical research provides evidence that, as applied, 17
U.S.C. § 107's codification of common law fair use has neither ex-
panded nor reduced the boundaries of the doctrine.42 In cases in-
volving fair use claims before 1976, the courts found a viable fair
use defense in 37.2% of cases in which it was invoked. This com-
pares with a rate of 37.5% in cases following the 1976 statute.43
The difference of less than half of a percentage point represents a
statistically insignificant distinction. Further, a graph of these re-
sults over time reveals no discernable trend or change in the pat-
37. Commentators have long disagreed whether any other factors beyond these four
exist. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985)
(Justice O'Connor's opinion broadly hints that the way in which Nation Enterprises ac-
quired the Ford memoirs weighed into the finding against fair use.). The most popular alter-
native factor is the possible expansion of fair use under the First Amendment. See generally
Goldstein, supra note 1, at § 10.3, and the good or bad faith of the alleged infringer.
38. See supra text accompanying note 27.
39. See, e.g., Trebonik v. Grossman Music Corp., 305 F. Supp. 339, 350 (N.D. Ohio
1969); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (quoting
H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988)).
40. HARRY G. HENN, COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 181 (1988). See also
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977).
41. House Report, supra note 33, at 66. The Supreme Court expressly endorsed this
notion in Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. at 549 ("The statutory formulation of the defense of
fair use in the Copyright Act reflects the intent of Congress to codify the common-law
doctrine.").
42. See Appendix, for details of the empirical procedure.
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tern.4" These facts indicate that the scope of the common law fair
use doctrine was successfully translated into statutory form via the
1976 Act4"
B. Procedural Aspects
Before analyzing the four statutory factors in detail," several
procedural aspects of the fair use defense are worth noting. First,
fair use is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and
proved by the alleged infringer.47 At least one court has refused to
read a fair use defense into pleadings that did not explicitly con-
tain one.48 The court stated that the "doctrine of fair use . . . was
meant to be used and has only been used, as a defense in infringe-
ment actions. '49 The court went on to note that fair use would not
excuse a technical failure to establish a copyright." In dismissing
the fair use doctrine, the district judge noted that the "defendant
can not cite a single authority to support its unique claim that the
doctrine can be asserted to excuse a failure to put copyright notice
on copies of a work of art intended for distribution to the press."'"
Further, the fair use defense must be clearly pleaded. In Dal-
las Cowboy Cheerleaders v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc.,52 the judge
chided the defendants that "[i]t may well be that if the parties had
developed their proof instead of rushing from this most prelimi-
nary hearing to appeal the defendants' fair use defense might pre-
vail."' 53 The court, while clearly sympathetic, refused to read the
defense into the pleadings. "Nothing beyond an unelaborated invo-
cation of the term 'parody' was ever put before the district court,
44. See Appendix.
45. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171,
1174 (5th Cir. 1980) (The legislature "in no way intended to depart from Court-created
principles or to short-circuit further judicial development.").
46. See infra text accompanying notes 93-166.
47. Fair use defense is a complete defense to an infringement action. See, e.g., Associa-
tion of Am. Medical Colleges v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 151 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("Since the
fair use exception to the Copyright Act is an affirmative defense to a suit for copyright
infringement, the party asserting the exception bears the burden of production and persua-
sion to show that the exception (and the defense) is applicable."), aff'd, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.
1984). However, the statute itself is not explicit on this point. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1,
at § 10.1.5. See also PATRY, supra note 1, at 477-78 n.4.
48. Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Building Comm'n of Chicago, 320 F.
Supp. 1303 (N.D. Ill 1970).
49. Id. at 1311.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979).
53. Id. at 1188.
1992]
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and we cannot fault the court if it found the simple allusion to the
concept of parody insufficient to shift the calculus of probability in
the defendants' favor."
54
One commentator has observed that "if the defendant dis-
charges its burden on one or more of section 107's four factors, the
burden may shift to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's use
was unfair." 5 However, another commentator, William Patry,
reaches the opposite result by relying on the Supreme Court's
opinion in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
56
regarding commercial uses.5" According to Patry, "procedurally,
commercial uses must overcome two presumptions: (a) that the de-
fense itself is available, and (b) that, as regards the fourth factor, a
likelihood of future harm does not exist.
'"5 8
These facts can be alleged and the affirmative defense estab-
lished at any stage allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.5 9 Fair use often is the basis of dispositive motions for either
summary judgment 0 or declaratory judgment.61 The outlines of
fair use may also be raised at the preliminary injunction hearing.
62
Empirical analysis shows that over 68% of all fair use deci-
sions are made following either a summary judgment motion or a
preliminary injunction hearing."' The following table details the
various stages of litigation at which a court has made a final deci-
sion as to the validity of a fair use defense:
STAGE OF LITIGATION % OF FINAL DECISION






Motions to dismiss are rarely fertile ground for resolution of
the fair use defense. For example, one judge determined that while
54. Id.
55. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 10.1.5.
56. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). See infra text accompanying notes 152-54.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 155-76.
58. PATRY, supra note 1, at 478.
59. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. PRO. 8(c).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 66-72.
61. See infra text accompanying note 80.
62. See generally NIMMER, supra note 1.
63. For details of the empiricism underlying the conclusion, see the Appendix.
[Vol. 9:121
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fair use may be appropriately determined on summary judgment,
it is not relevant subject matter for a motion to dismiss. 4
Fair use defenses are more commonly decided on motions for
preliminary injunction. 5 Because the grant or denial of a prelimi-
nary injunction so drastically affects negotiating positions of both
parties, it is critical that the affirmative defense be clearly and con-
vincingly demonstrated at this stage of the litigation.
More fair use defenses are resolved at the summary judgment
stage than at any other.6 This is unusual, given district courts'
traditional reluctance to grant summary judgment.6 7 Summary
judgment is proper only if there is "no genuine issue as to any ma-
terial fact" in dispute s.6  The subtle weighing of equitable factors
inherent in fair use cases makes summary judgment a difficult is-
sue for the judge. Paul Goldstein divides the summary judgment
process in a fair use case into two steps: 9 First, "the question
whether a defendant's use is for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research, and thus
comes within the scope of fair use under the first sentence [of sec-
tion 107], is particularly amenable to disposition as a matter of
law." 0 Further, Goldstein concludes that if the defendant cannot
demonstrate this, "summary judgment for the plaintiff is appropri-
ate." 17 Second, if "the defendant's use comes within the scope of
fair use, the court must make an essentially factual determination
on each of the four factors.
'7 2
Historically, in part because fair use is an equitable doctrine
64. Chicago Lawyer, Ltd. v. Forty-Sixth Ward Regular Democratic Org., 220 U.S.P.Q.
511 (N.D. Ill. 1982). But see Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Publishing Corp., 31 F. Supp.
817 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (motion to dismiss allowed on basis of fair use defense). Many of these
earlier decisions (1938-1950) still bear the hallmarks, both in practice and decision, of a slow
adjustment to notice pleading and the Federal Rules. See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL
Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 5.8 (1985).
65. E.g., Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984); D.C. Comics, Inc.
v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
66. See chart on page _
67. District courts have become less reluctant to grant summary judgment following
1986 Supreme Court decisions broadly expanding the reach of summary judgment. See gen-
erally Matthew W. Wallace, Comment, Overruling Tradition: Summary Judgment in the
Eleventh After 1986, 41 MERCER L. REV. 737 (1990), for an analysis of these changes in the
11th Circuit.
68. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 56(c).
69. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 10.1.5.
70. Id.
71. Id. Goldstein's analysis is, at this point, a bit too rigid and ignores the equitable
nature of the fair use doctrine. The list of six uses in the first sentence of 17 U.S.C. § 107 is
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without precise legal boundaries, courts concluded that when there
was any doubt, summary judgment in these cases would be im-
proper.73 Many judges also opposed pre-trial resolution of fair use
defenses, because, as one noted: "On the whole, I am persuaded
that the determination of the 'fair use' should not be resolved on
affidavits but is best left to the trial judge.
'74
Courts have, however, become more willing to grant summary
judgment when both parties seek it. 75 The issue can thus be con-
sidered ripe for decision on summary judgment when both parties
make cross-motions for summary judgment.7" When "the facts are
fully exposed without dispute and both sides agree that summary
judgment is proper, each asking for such judgment" the issue may
be resolved in this manner.77 Infrequently, fair use may arise on
declaratory judgment.7 Such a motion, however, must be clear as
to the facts and record.79 A declaratory judgment in favor of fair
use can be made."'
Despite the considerable confusion in cases like Salinger v.
Random House, Inc.81 and New Era Publications International v.
Henry Holt and Co.,82 as well as the numerous, confusing and
often contradictory commentators,83 trial court determinations re-
garding fair use are safer on appeal than are other types of civil
cases. 4 Empirical research conducted for this Article revealed that
73. E.g., Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ("At least, the
court entertains a doubt in that regard and for that reason this motion [for summary judg-
ment] is denied."). See also D.C. Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir.
1982) (revocation of summary judgment where defense cannot be held valid as a matter of
law).
74. New York Tribune v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). See also
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939).
75. See Dow Jones & Company, Inc. v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, Copy L.
Rep. P 25,411 (E.D. Ill. 1982) (summary judgment on fair use issue is improper unless both
parties seek it). See also Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
76. See, e.g., Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964).
77. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 57.
79. See Public Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated,
369 U.S. 111 (1962), on remand, 268 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1967).
80. See Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. 809 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
81. 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 890 (1987). See Judge Leval's article, supra note 2. Judge Leval, who has had two
fair use opinions reversed, discusses his rationales at length.
82. 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), af'd, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 884
F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989).
83. See supra note 1.
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78.6% of all cases appealing fair use issues were affirmed,8 5 com-
pared to an affirmance rate of 64% in all civil claims. "' The empiri-
cal analysis also shows that a slightly greater percentage of nonfair
uses than fair uses were affirmed.
AFFIRMANCE AND REVERSAL RATES
FAIR USE AFFIRMED NON-FAIR USE AFFIRMED
73.7% 82.6%
FAIR USE REVERSED NON-FAIR USE REVERSED
26.3% 17.4%
These high affirmance rates indicate that there is substantial
agreement between judges in the court of appeals and the district
courts.87
It is worth noting, however, that the appellate courts have the
power to fully review each of the section 107 statutory factors.88
Appellate courts may also decide the issue based on the lower
court's factual findings. The Eleventh Circuit, for instance, has
held that "[flair use is probably best characterized as a mixed
question of law and fact that can be decided by an appellate court
if the trial court has found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the
four statutory factors."89
The Congressional codification of the fair use doctrine is, on
the whole, a marvel of drafting. The statute establishes broad in-
terpretive guidelines, yet retains substantial flexibility 0 The exact
boundaries of fair use are undefinable. As Professor Dratler noted:
In the twilight zone of fair use, there are no statutory rules, only
factors for consideration. Therefore the form of a judicial opin-
ion may be as important as its substance .... Courts do not
advance Congress' purpose by omitting portions of the congres-
sional prescription. Nor do they advance it by mixing one frac-
tion with another, adulterating the fractions with extraneous
85. See Appendix for methodology.
86. See Federal Judicial Center, Summary Judgment Practice in Three District
Courts 9 (1987).
87. This, in itself, also indicates the high caliber of judges that populate the federal
bench.
88. E.g., Puma Indus. Consulting, Inc. v. Daal Assocs., 808 F.2d 982, 987 (2d Cir.
1987).
89. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n.8 (11th Cir. 1984).
90. Section 107 states in pertinent part: "In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered shall include .... 
subsections (1) through (4). 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). This opens the door to a broad range of
additional factors, some of which are discussed infra notes 167-80.
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matter, or neglecting to weigh and mix all the fractions in light
of copyright policy."
Dratler's analysis points to the necessity that courts speak in a
common language. By authoring opinions centered around these
four statutory factors, courts can better explain to the practitioner
exactly why they held for or against the fair use defense.92
Before discussing the various factual paradigms, this Article
will analyze in detail each of the factors enumerated in section
107(1-4) in order to illustrate quantitatively and qualitatively how
the courts utilize them.
III. 17 U.S.C. § 107 - THE FAIR USE STATUTE
A. The Purpose of the Use
The first statutory factor of section 107 requires that courts
analyze "the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes."93 "Purpose and character" implicitly includes factors
such as "criticism, comment, news reporting" and others,94 but it is
the commercial use/noncommercial use distinction that looms larg-
est in calculating the weight to be given to § 107(1).15
The Supreme Court has held that "every commercial use of
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the
monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright."9' A
year later, the Court further refined its analysis: "The crux of the
profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the
use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the cus-
tomary price."9 "
This commercial/noncommercial distinction extends to other
91. Dratler, supra note 1, at 288.
92. Not all courts engage in a point-by-point discussion of each factor enumerated in
section 107(1-4). However, the Second Circuit, by and large, attempts to discuss each of the
statutory factors in reaching its decisions. Significantly, the Supreme Court failed to do this
in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), and Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
95. See generally NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 13.05[a][1].
96. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). See
also Sony's articulation of section 107(4), infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
97. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
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nonprofit uses. In Weissmann v. Freeman,8 for example, an edu-
cational syllabus written and used by a researcher and his assistant
was unfairly used by the researcher when he deleted his assistant's
name and distributed it at a conference on nuclear medicine.9 The
district court struck down arguments by the defendant that a use
without economic gain was always noncommercial. 100 The court
reasoned as follows:
Monetary gain is not the sole criterion. Dr. Freeman stood to
gain recognition among his peers in the profession and author-
ship credit with his attempted use of Weissmann's article; he
did so without paying the usual price that accompanies scientific
research and writing, that is to say, by the sweat of his brow.
Particularly in an academic setting, profit is ill measured in dol-
lars. Instead, what is valuable is recognition because it so often
influences professional advancement and academic tenure. The
absence of a dollars and cents profit does not inevitably lead to
a finding of fair use.10'
Thus, any use of copyrighted material for profit, whether personal
or economic, represents a presumptively unfair use.
Commercial purposes overwhelmingly dominate the empirical
analysis of fair use.0 2 In over 90% of the cases sampled, courts
found the use at issue to be "commercial" in some form. Sub rosa
all courts seem to weigh the degree of commercial use. For exam-
ple, in Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,'0' the
defendant copied three sentences about the benefits of smoking
from the plaintiff's scientific work. 0 4 The defendant's use of this
information in an advertising pamphlet was held unfair.
0 5
Courts seem less rigorous when another use, in addition to
commercial benefit, can be shown. One alternative use is "public
benefit." In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,10
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that: "Whether an author or publisher reaps economic benefits
from the sale of a biographical work, or whether its publication is
motivated in part by a desire for commercial gain. . . has no bear-
98. 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989).
99. Id. at 1315-16.
100. Id. at 1324.
101. Id.
102. See Appendix.
103. 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
104. Id. at 304.
105. Id.
106. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
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ing on whether a public benefit may be derived from such a
work.' 1 7 These two decisions demonstrate, at least in part, that a
different set of principles may be applied to factually distinct, but
legally similar, situations. 08
The next clause of section 107(1)-"or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes,"l 09-lumps together two distinct aspects of per-
missible fair uses: nonprofit uses and educational uses."0 At least
one commentator has read into the Supreme Court's Sony"l' opin-
ion a presumption that noncommercial, charitable uses are fair." 2
This reading is too broad. As one copyright attorney explained:
"[T]he court was careful not to create a presumption in favor of
fair use for every nonprofit use.""11 3 This analysis is consistent with
"the explicit refusal of Congress to create such a presumption that
nonprofit educational uses were not to be given any special status
under section 107. .. .
Nonetheless, the use of a copyrighted item by a nonprofit or-
ganization, or for a nonprofit purpose, is likely to be deemed
fair.'15 The number of such cases is small, but courts found the use
fair 55.6% of the time, which is significantly higher than the 37.4%
found in fair use cases generally." 6 In Wojnarowicz v. American
Family Ass'n,117 a not-for-profit organization published complete
copies of the plaintiff's exhibit to help criticize the National Edu-
cation Association's funding of the plaintiff's work."' The court
ruled that the use was fair, and noted that because of "the contro-
versial issue of federal funding of contemporary art, the pamphlet
is entitled to great protection because the appropriateness of such
funding must remain open to vigorous challenge and those who ac-
107. Id. at 307. See also Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
108. This is the root of the differing factual paradigms which are discussed fully infra
text accompanying notes 181-395.
109. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
110. This is not what was intended, because nonprofit, noneducational uses are pro-
tected, see, e.g., Key Maps, Inc. v. Pruitt, 470 F. Supp. 33 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (fire chief may
make copies of map and distribute them to firehouses without violating copyright), just as
for-profit educational uses are sometimes protected.
111. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
112. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 10.2.2.1.(a).
113. See PATRY supra note 1, at 370.
114. Id.
115. But see Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243
(W.D.N.Y. 1978), 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), 558 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1983)
(wholesale taping by nonprofit organization held to be an unfair use).
116. See Appendix.
117. 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
118. Id. at 132.
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cept federal funds must also accept the right of others to protest
such expenditures." '119
Educational uses, the second part of section 107(1), are fa-
vored by the statute. 12 0 Moreover, the exact parameters of class-
room use are clearly delineated.'21 Despite these generous guide-
lines, however, "educational purposes have not fared as
consistently well in the courts."'12 2 An educational purpose is al-
leged as a defense in 30.5% of all fair use cases, 2 3 and accepted by
the court 52.5% of the time (considerably more than the 37.4%
average).' 24 Describing an unauthorized use of copyrighted mate-
rial as "educational" lends significant weight to the fair use
defense.
25
B. Nature of Copyrighted Work
Under section 107(2), "the nature of the copyrighted work"' 2 6
is analyzed to help determine whether a given use of that work is
fair. Of the four provisions in section 107, this is the least used in
practice and least discussed in fair use scholarship. 2 7 Professor
Dratler explains: "Courts generally agree that analysis of the 'na-
ture' factor requires placing the underlying work on the spectrum
from fact to fancy."' " This analysis, however, covers one impor-
tant aspect of the second factor and ignores another.
119. Id. at 143.
120. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 10.2.2.(b).
121. An excellent discussion can be found in PATRY, supra note 1, at 272-291. As Patry
noted:
The book and periodical guidelines alfow single copying "by or for a teacher at
his or her individual request" for scholarly research or use in teaching or prepa-
ration for teaching of (a) a chapter from a book; (b) an article from a periodical
or newspaper; (c) a short story, short essay, or short poem, "whether or not from
a collective work"; (d) a chart, graph, diagram, drawing, cartoon, or picture from
a book, periodical, or newspaper. The making of multiple copies for these pur-
poses is not permitted, however.
Id. at 405 (quoting House Report, supra note 32, at 68.).
122. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 10.2.2.(b).
123. Historical works and biographies are deemed educational uses.
124. See Appendix, for an empirical analysis.
125. See, e.g., Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(historical value of films of Kennedy assassination). But see Roy Export Co. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), ai'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.
1982) (copies of Charlie Chaplin films not of great historical moment because Chaplin was
excluded from the United States because of procommunist activities).
126. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988).
127. An analysis of cases citing the various provisions of section 107(1-4) demonstrates
that section 107(2) is the least discussed of the four.
128. Dratler, supra note 1, at 303.
1992)
15
Wallace: Analyzing Fair Use Claims: A Quantitative and Paradigmatic Approa
Published by Institutional Repository, 1992
136 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
There are two different considerations in section 107(2) analy-
sis. First, the statute recognizes that an unpublished work enjoys
substantially more protection than a published work. 12 9 In Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,s° the Supreme
Court determined that the unpublished nature of a work "is a crit-
ical element of its 'nature.' "13' The Court further noted that
"[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the
first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will out-
weigh a claim of fair use.' s2 It follows, then, that the unpublished
nature of a copyrighted work enhances its protection from "fair"
use by an infringer.
l33
Second, section 107(2) addresses the difference between fac-
tual and fictional works.' While this distinction is better defined
by the factual paradigms discussed in Part IV, simply stated," 5 it
operates as follows: A copyrighted work that is primarily factual in
nature, such as a telephone book, receives less protection from fair
use.
1 36
C. Amount and Substantiality Used
According to section 107(3), courts should consider "the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole' 3 7 in determining fair use. This ap-
proach, along with the section 107(4), 138 is rooted in Justice Story's
opinion in Folsom v. Marsh.3 9 There are two complementary sub-
considerations: 1) the quantitative amount copied by the in-
fringer, 4 ' and 2) the qualitative value of the infringed section.''
129. See NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 13.05[a][2].
130. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
131. Id. at 564.
132. Id. at 555.
133. See also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 890 (1987).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 276-301.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 191-395.
136. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217
(D.N.J. 1977).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 147-67.
139. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
140. For example, the unfair use in Nation Enterprises was some 300 words from an
unpublished 200,000-word manuscript. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises, 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985). As Professor Dratler has noted, all nine justices agreed that
both a quantitative and qualitative measure should be taken. See Dratler, supra note 1, at
310.
141. Theoretically, if a single word of a 10,000-word poem held the core of the entire
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This calls for a delicate balancing act. "[I]n examining the third
fair use factor, one must look to the value of the portion appropri-
ated as well as the quantity. Note too that the analysis is of the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work and not to defendant's work.'
'1 42
Courts will generally rule against a fair use defense if the de-
fendant has appropriated all or substantially all of a work.143 Em-
pirical research supports this conclusion. 44 In fair use cases where
substantial copying occurred, courts sustained a fair use defense
only 16.3% of the time. The first notable case finding a fair use
despite substantial copying was Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States,4 5 wherein the Court of Claims held that copies of copy-
righted medical journals made by government medical research
constituted a "fair use." '146
D. Effect on the Potential Market
The final factor in section 107 is "the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.' 147 The
Supreme Court has unanimously agreed that this factor "is un-
doubtedly the single most important element of fair use."' 4 s As
noted earlier, 49 Justice Story discussed this factor in his Folsom
opinion. 5° This element of the fair use doctrine factor springs
most directly from the heart of copyright law. If the market for the
original work is diminished then, presumably, the incentive for cre-
ating new works is diminished as well.' 51 There is, however, a coun-
tervailing presumption that by limiting the ability to build upon
the works of a predecessor, creative development is limited as
work's meaning, such an appropriation would not be a fair use.
142. PATRY, supra note 1, at 452 (emphasis in original). See also Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
143. See, e.g., Phillips v. Constitution Pub. Co., 72 U.S.P.Q. 69 (N.D. Ga. 1947);
Trebonik v. Grossman Music Corp., 305 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
144. See Appendix.
145. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
146. Id. at 1381. See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417
(1984). Parody represents a special case, see the factual paradigms discussed infra text ac-
companying notes 227-68.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988).
148. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
The dissenting justices also endorsed this proposition. See id. at 602 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
149. See supra note 27.
150. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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well.' 52
The Supreme Court, in its seminal Sony opinion, 153 resolved
this tension by establishing a presumption against commercial
uses.6 4 The court determined that:
[A]lthough every commercial use of copyrighted material is pre-
sumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that
belongs to the owner of the copyright, noncommercial uses are a
different matter. A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copy-
righted work requires proof either that the particular use is
harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would ad-
versely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work. Ac-
tual present harm need not be shown; such a requirement would
leave the copyright holder with no defense against predictable
damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future
harm will result. What is necessary is a showing by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future
harm exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, that
likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial
purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.'55
While this construction has come under considerable criticism by
commentators, 56 empirical research indicates that if the infringe-
ment of a copyrighted work has substantial market impact, either
presumed'57 or actual,' any fair use claim is doomed. If a court
finds a substantial market impact, which happens in 38.2% of
cases, a fair use defense is successful only 12% of the time.'59 For
example, in Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co.,'6 0 Boston Magazine re-
printed a copyrighted questionnaire about love which was com-
piled by research scientists.' 6' In finding the use unfair, the court
observed:
The defendants' use of the plaintiff's copyrighted material
clearly affected the plaintiff's potential market for the [love]
scales. Before defendants had used the scales, Reader's Digest
had shown an interest in paying the plaintiff for a license to use
152. This competing tension is the underlying conflict between the needs and the limi-
tations of copyright law.
153. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
154. See generally Dratler, supra note 1, at 265.
155. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (emphasis in original).
156. See Dratler, supra note 1, at 265-66.
157. See, e.g., Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983).
158. See, e.g., Mills Music Inc. v. State of Arizona, 187 U.S.P.Q. 22 (D. Ariz. 1975).
159. See Appendix.
160. 645 F.2d 80 (Ist Cir. 1981).
161. Id. at 83.
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them. It may reasonably be inferred that after defendants' use,
Reader's Digest and other publishers would be less inclined to
pay the plaintiff for use of his material in a popular magazine.
162
Courts are willing to speculate, in their section 107 analysis,
about the amount of direct damage caused to the copyright
holder's primary market flowing from unauthorized use of the pro-
tected material; they generally will not deny a fair use claim be-
cause of a merely indirect effect on that same primary market.163
In Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal
Corp.,1" the Second Circuit held that it was a fair use for Regina
Vacuum Cleaners to quote from a Consumer Reports article in ad-
vertisements for its products. 65 The court rejected the magazine's
argument that an endorsement of a product, which might be im-
plied by the appearance of its article in the advertisement, "could
be the demise of Consumers Union since such commercial use
could lead the public to view Consumers Union as [an] unfair tes-
ter of products."" 6' The court noted that such injury is beyond the
reach of the fourth factor: "[I]t is the value of possible future is-
sues of Consumer Reports which [Consumers Union] seeks to pro-
tect. This clearly does not involve the fourth factor which focuses




While the four factors listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107(1-4) were never
intended to be exclusive, courts disagree over which other factors
should be considered in the fair use analysis.6 8 The two most fre-
quently mentioned are the mental state of the alleged infringer,
and whether the First Amendment is implicated in the fair use. 6 9
More than one court has held that the fair use doctrine pre-
supposes good faith on the part of the infringer. 70 There is noth-
ing in a plain reading of the statute, however, to indicate that good
162. Id. at 84.
163. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 10.2.2.4.
164. 724 F.2d 1044 (1983).
165. Id. at 1046.
166. Id. at 1050.
167. Id. at 1051 (emphasis in original).
168. See supra note 1.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 174-80.
170. See, e.g., Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1983). See also Justice
O'Connor's references in Nation Enterprises to the "purloined manuscript." Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1985).
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or bad faith should be considered at all,17 1 or the effect such a find-
ing should have. Sub rosa many courts seem to apply a good faith
standard, even in places where the copyright holder opposed the
use.17 2 The application of good faith standards have a differing role
depending upon the factual paradigm involved.1
7 3
A second consideration in fair use analysis is whether the First
Amendment is implicated, and whether it should broaden the
scope of fair use. 17 4 Prior to 1985, courts were split on this issue,1
5
but many endorsed the notion that the "scope of [fair use] is un-
doubtedly wider when the information conveyed relates to matters
of high public concern."''
The Supreme Court appeared to settle this issue in Nation
Enterprises:1
7
In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied
in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expres-
sion and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we
see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to ceate
what amounts to a public figure [President Ford] exception to
copyright. Whether verbatim copying from a public figure's
manuscript in a given case is or is not fair must be judged ac-
cording to the traditional equities of fair use.' 7
While there might be separate First Amendment claims, the Su-
preme Court sharply blunted the argument that the First amend-
ment broadens the scope of fair use.
There is, however, still room for maneuver. Recently, the
171. "[C]laims of bad faith have little place in the statutory structure built by Con-
gress. . . . Unpleasant conduct, however, is peripheral to the concerns of copyright law. Ac-
cordingly, bad faith should be considered, if at all, as a separate nonstatutory factor and
given relatively little weight." Dratler, supra note 1, at 336.
172. One obvious example is parody, where the plaintiff may not relish his role as the
subject of satire. See, e.g., Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp
741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
173. Compare infra text accompanying notes 232 and 347.
174. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 10.3.
175. Compare Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d
1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The First Amendment is not a license to trammel on legally
recognized rights in intellectual property.") with Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citi-
zens for Gallen Committee, 457 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D.N.H. 1978) ("Conflicts between inter-
ests protected by the First Amendment and the copyright laws can be resolved by applica-
tion of the fair use doctrine.").
176. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d
1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983). Accord Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper
Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1942).
177. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
178. Id. at 560.
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United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, in Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n,179 held that "the
breadth of fair use varies and where vital First Amendment con-
cerns are implicated, as here, that breadth expands and accords
greater protection to what might otherwise constitute an
infringement.' 180
IV. FACTUAL PARADIGMS: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The four statutory elements of section 107 form the basis for
any fair use defense.' Simple analysis of these factors, however,
provides little or no tactical guidance for the practitioner who
must choose how to best argue a fair use issue and evaluate his or
her likelihood of success. Part IV of this Article suggests an alter-
native approach: to analyze fair use cases with emphasis on their
factual similarity. 2  From this perspective most 8 3 fair use cases
fall within one of six broad interactive paradigms:8 4 (1) incidental
appropriation; (2) appropriation by or for nonprofit purpose; (3)
appropriation for satire or parody; (4) appropriation for criticism
or historical comment; (5) exploitation of factual complications or
data bases; and (6) appropriation for commercial exploitation.
Each of these paradigms will be discussed in turn, explaining the
appropriate boundaries and the applicable principles. These para-
digms are intended to be a helpful guide in the procedural aspects
such as pleading or responding to fair use defenses. Each factual
paradigm emphasizes the elements of a particular fair use claim
and the method by which that claim can best be supported or
attacked.
A. Incidental Appropriation
The core of this first paradigm is that the reproduction of the
179. 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
180. Id. at 147. For a more complete discussion of American Family, see infra text
accompanying notes 218-19. See also Oakes, supra note 1, at 989.
181. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1-4) (1988). See supra text accompanying notes 131-78.
182. Factual similarity is distinct from legal similarity. Legal similarity means two fac-
tual situations that have similar legal consequences. For example, a human thumb found in
a plug of chewing tobacco and an airplane crashing without reason possess legal similarity in
that res ipsa loquitur allies to both.
183. With very few exceptions, this approach covers all fair uses. The exceptions in-
volve novel questions. See, e.g., Association of American Medical Colleges v. Cuomo, 1991
U.S. App. LEXIS 4075 (2d Cir. 1991) (conflict between copyright holder and New York
Standardized Testing Act).
184. The concept of paradigm has been used because differing standards and elements
such as good faith carry slightly different meanings in each functional grouping.
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copyrighted material was merely incidental to the infringer's ac-
tions. Stated otherwise, the alleged infringement occurred as an in-
direct and unintentional by-product of the copying. In Italian
Book Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,' an ABC television
crew, while filming a parade, included a portion of plaintiff's song
which was subsequently telecast. 86 The court found that "[i]t
would have been unreasonable for the technicians at ABC to do
anything other than they did, in preparing the film clip for inclu-
sion in the news telecast."'81 7 ABC's incidental use of the song was
held to be fair. Essentially, then, infringement by accident is a fair
use. This paradigm will rarely be seen, because the nature of the
use is incidental to both the copyright holder and the infringer.'
8s
B. Appropriation by or for Nonprofit Purposes
Except for incidental appropriation,'89 the other paradigms
are interrelated and cannot be defined by bright line tests. This is
because any set of facts may carry several, often opposing, values.
For example, parodies, 90 which may have been produced for a
commercial benefit, qualify for a greater protection than generic
commercial uses. 9 ' Given the conflict between two paradigms, a
use which can be cast as something other than mere commercial
exploitation is more likely to find judicial favor.
An appropriation by or for a nonprofit purpose is significantly
more likely to be given fair use protection, so long as the alleged
fair use does not demonstrably reduce the copyrighted work's mar-
ket. 92 In Key Maps, Inc. v. Pruitt,193 the court found a fire chiefs
185. 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
186. Id. at 66.
187. Id. at 70. Some commentators would analyze this in terms of the high transaction
cost implicit in attempting to spend time contracting each copyright holder whose rights
might be infringed in broadcasting news film clips. See, e.g., Landers & Posner, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 325, 357 (1989).
188. Hypothetically, a news report of a meeting in which an edition of a copyrightable
book is displayed or read aloud could constitute an infringement of the author's copyright.
However, if the news report, when broadcast, is about something other than either the book
or its author, the publication of the copyrighted material is only incidental to the report
itself, and the use may be fair. For an example of a commercial exploitation inappropriately
cloaked as an incidental appropriation, see Schumann v. Albuquerque Corp., 664 F. Supp.
473 (D.N.M. 1987); infra notes 360-62 (broadcast of playing band by spot pickup infringes
performers right to exclusive performance).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 185-88.
190. See infra text accompanying notes 227-68.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 253-68. This same conflict holds true for bio-
graphical uses (often for profit), and educational uses as well.
192. See infra discussion of Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 447
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reproduction and distribution of maps drawn by plaintiff to be a
fair use. 94 Pruitt, the fire chief, engaged Key Maps to produce fire
maps of the unincorporated areas of Harris County, Texas.
195
When Key Maps produced the maps, but delayed making copies of
them, Chief Pruitt had reproductions made elsewhere.'96 After re-
producing the map, Pruitt distributed them to fire departments,
sheriff's offices, and the like.
97
When Key Maps brought a claim for copyright infringement,
the court barred recovery "because the use of the composite Fire
Zone Map was for a legitimate, fair, and reasonable purpose,
namely, the coordination of fire prevention activities in the incor-
porated areas of Harris County."' 9 8 The court went on to note that
"Pruitt's use of the maps was not of a commercial nature because
the distribution was not in competition with the Plaintiff but
solely for internal purposes which related to a discernable public
interest.""19 In Key Maps, the actions of the Fire Chief marginally
infringed upon Key Maps' market by depriving them of the value
of making copies, which were made by a competitor.200
However, a nonprofit use is not automatically a fair use.
Courts have held against fair use involving nonprofit organizations
where the damage to the copyright holder's market is real and con-
vincingly proven,'0 ' or where the nonprofit use eliminates the
copyright holder's entire market.
20 2
The Ninth Circuit denied fair use protection to a defendant
who copied almost 50% of a copyrighted book, even though the
copied portion was utilized in a nonprofit classroom exercise.20 3
Rowley, the teacher, copied portions of the plaintiff's cake decorat-
ing book after attending an adult education class. 0 4 Rowley then
incorporated portions of the book into a Learning Activity Package
("LAP"), which she made available to her students.20 5 "Plaintiff
F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), 558 F. Supp. 1247
(W.D.N.Y. 1983).
193. 470 F. Supp. 33 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
194. Id. at 38.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 36.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 38.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 36.
201. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
203. Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1177 (1983).
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learned of Rowley's LAP . . . when a student in plaintiff's adult
education class refused to purchase plaintiff's book. The student's
son had obtained a copy of the LAP from Rowley's class.20 6 The
court held that Rowley's use was unfair. 0 7 The linchpin of the
court's reasoning was that Rowley's infringement directly and con-
cretely affected the market for the plaintiff's copyrighted work.208
That demonstrable impact, coupled with Rowley's blatant unau-
thorized duplication of the book, outweighed the nonprofit nature
of Rowley's use.209
Similarly, the nonprofit status of an infringer can be out-
weighed when the use would destroy the copyright holder's entire
market. In Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v.
Crooks,21 0 three educational film producers sued the Board of Co-
operative Educational Services of Erie County (BOCES) for vide-
otaping and distributing plaintiff's educational programs to area
schools. 1 As the trial judge noted: "The scope of BOCES' activi-
ties is difficult to reconcile with its claim of fair use. This case does
not involve an isolated instance of a teacher copying copyrighted
material for classroom use but concerns a highly organized and
systematic program for reproducing video tapes on a massive
scale. '21 2 The videotaping activity used five to eight full-time em-
ployees and "makes as many as ten thousand tapes per year."213 In
a subsequent opinion, the court settled on this salient fact:
Fair use must be reasonable . . . it is . .. not reasonable to
drive plaintiffs from the educational television market. Plain-
tiffs' choice of facing unlimited videotape copying [of their pro-
grams] or abandonment of the educational television market
cannot be seen as providing reasonable market alternatives to
fair use by the defendants.214 The educational contents and na-
ture of the films in this case do not, in and of itself, 'empower a
court to ignore a copyright whenever it determines the underly-
ing work contains material of possible public importance.'
18
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1178.
208. Id. at 1177.
209. Compare Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962) (no fair use when defend-
ant attempted to profit by appropriation of plaintiff's copyright).
210. 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), and 558
F. Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). For a valuable discussion of the multiple Crooks opinions,
see PATRY, supra note 1, at 195-200.
211. 447 F. Supp. at 246.
212. Id. at 252.
213. Id.
214. 542 F. Supp at 1174.
215. Id. at 1178 (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Foundation, Inc. v. American
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Notably absent from this paradigm is a special place for edu-
cational uses. Analysis of case law leads to the conclusion that edu-
cational uses and nonprofit uses are favored in different ways.21
While nonprofit educational uses may fall into this category, for-
profit educational uses do not.217 Claims for a nonprofit civic pur-
pose or political argumentation also fall within this paradigm.
As noted earlier, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that the publication of pictures of an art exhibit
funded by the National Education Association in order to criticize
funding was a fair use.218 The court imposed a quid pro quo that
those who receive federal funds must subject themselves to fair use
criticism of the funding.21 9
Similarly, collecting pictures for a nuisance abatement pro-
ceeding fell within the scope of fair use.220 In Jartech, Inc. v.
Clancy, an investigator who snuck into a theater showing porno-
graphic movies used audio-visual equipment to record the pictures
and sound. 221 The pictures were subsequently utilized at a city
council nuisance abatement proceeding.222 Plaintiff brought suit
claiming copyright infringement. 223 The court broadly read section
107 to find fair use:
The alleged infringers made abbreviated copies of the films, not
for subsequent use and enjoyment, but for evidence to be used
in the nuisance abatement proceeding .... While the statutory
standards are not precisely applicable to the facts at bar, be-
cause there was evidence that the Council's use was neither
commercially exploitive of the copyright holder's market, the
jury's verdict [of fair use] is certainly supported by substantial
evidence.2 2
4
Any use that is armed with the badge of nonprofit activity is
Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980)). In Crooks, the defendants asserted a
First Amendment defense which the court readily dismissed. Id. at 1180-81.
216. See infra notes 267-95, for history and biographical works.
217. See, e.g., Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y.
1963) (manual of solutions to problems in college textbook was an unfair use). This analysis
may seem perverse in light of discussion in supra note 110. The purpose of that discussion,
however, was to point out that both nonprofit and educational uses were favored under 17
U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
218. Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
219. Id. at 143.
220. Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982).
221. Id. at 404.
222. Id. at 405.
223. Id. at 404.
224. Id. at 407.
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much more likely to be declared fair. This general rule has been
applied to election campaigns22 5 as well as solicitations by churches
for money.22
C. Appropriation for Satire or Parody
Parody2 has long enjoyed protection as a viable category of
fair use. 28 Many commentators have found a unique niche for par-
ody.229 The dean of copyright law, Professor Nimmer, determined
that satire and parody represent a "functional differentiation" and
that "such a functional differentiation has been recognized to sup-
port a fair use defense."230 The parody factual paradigm mimics
this "functional differentiation" by recognizing that "parody and
satire are deserving of substantial freedom-both as entertainment
and as a form of social and literary criticism."231
The focus here is less on the good faith of the infringer and
more on the nature of the parody, because rarely would the copy-
right holder grant his or her consent to be the object of satire. Un-
less there is any demonstrable market damage or misuse of the
purpose of the parody, a parody or satire will usually be held a fair
use under section 107(3).22 "Courts apply a special version of the
third factor in determining whether a parody constitutes a fair use:
the extent to which the defendant has taken more than is neces-
sary to conjure up the copyrighted work."23
225. See, e.g., Keep Thomsom Governor Committee v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457
F. Supp. 957 (D.N.H. 1978) (defendant's use of plaintiff's copyrighted song in a political
advertisement considered fair).
226. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir.
1986) (Jerry Falwell sent out copies of harsh parody of himself in order to raise money to
sue Hustler's publisher Larry Flynt. The court found the use fair, noting that Falwell's
action had not diminished sales of the magazine.).
227. Parody is defined in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 467 F.
Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), as follows:
A parody is a work in which the language or style of another work is closely
imitated or mimicked for comic effect or ridicule. A satire is a work which holds
up the vices or shortcomings of an individual or institution to ridicule or deri-
sion, usually with an intent to stimulate change; the use of wit, irony or sarcasm
for the purpose of exposing and discrediting vice or folly.
Id. at 376.
228. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 10.2.1.2.
229. See PATRY, supra note 1, at 147-76.
230. NIMMER,-supra note 1, at § 13.05[c].
231. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822
(1964).
232. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988). See supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
233. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 10.2.2.3. This analysis relies on the oft-quoted lan-
guage from Berlin, 329 F.2d at 545, which states as follows:
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In Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,23 4 the
court found Saturday Night Live's biting parody of the "I Love
New York" jingle to be a fair use.235 Central to the court's finding
was the brief nature of the parodied lyrics.23 6
[T]he court believes that the repetition of the phrase ["I Love
. .."], sung a capella and lasting for only eighteen seconds, can-
not be said to be clearly more than was necessary to 'conjure up'
the original. Nor was it so substantial a taking as to preclude
this use from being a fair one.
2 37
The same court reached the opposite result in Walt Disney
Productions v. Mature Pictures Corp.238 In the defendant's movie,
"The Life and Times of the Happy Hooker," the Mickey Mouse
March was repeated "over and over again."239 The court suggested
that defendants were attempting to parody the sexual behavior of
the call girls' clients.240 However, it was the repetitive nature of the
song's use and the broad object of the parody that doomed the
defendant's fair use defense.24' The repeated use of the copy-
righted music was more than necessary to parody the original
work. "While defendants may have been seeking in their display of
bestiality to parody life, they did not parody the Mickey Mouse
March but sought only to improperly use the copyrighted
material.
242
A permissible parody may not take more of the original work
than is necessary to conjure up the image of cartoon character. In
Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates,24 the parodist portrayed
Mickey Mouse and Company as members of a drugged out, pro-
miscuous counterculture.2 44 The use was clearly an intentional par-
At the very least, where, as here, it is clear that the parody has neither the
intent nor the effect of fulfilling the demand for the original, and where the
parodist does not appropriate a greater amount of the original work than is nec-
essary to 'recall or conjure up' the object of his satire, a finding of infringement
would be improper.
234. 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
235. Id. at 747. The tune was changed to "I Love Sodom." Id. at 743.
236. Id. at 744. "Of this [the original composition] only four notes, D C D E (in that
sequence), and the works "I Love" were taken and used in the SNL sketch.
237. Id. at 747 (quoting without attribution from Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329
F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964)).
238. 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).




243. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
244. Id. at 753.
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ody, but the fair use defense proved inapplicable. "By copying the
images in their entirety, defendants took more than was necessary
to place firmly in the reader's mind the parodied work and those
specific attributes that are to be satirized.
245
These cases also suggest that courts may cast a more critical
eye at sexual parodies. 246 For example, the Second Circuit consid-
ered a parody of the song "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company
C," entitled "Cunnilingus Champion of Company C," an unfair
use.247 However, in Guccione v. Flynt2 4s the court upheld as fair
the republication in Hustler magazine a photo originally printed in
Penthouse magazine *.2 4  Hustler's publisher printed alongside the
pirated photograph a long diatribe against the Penthouse owner,
describing in lurid detail the rival publisher's physical attributes
and his fondness for girls young enough to be his daughter. s 0 With
"genuine reluctance" to become the "referee" in this matter, the
court held that use was fair,2 51 reasoning that:
"Penthouse has failed to submit any evidence that the value of
its September 1983 issue [from which Hustler appropriated the
photograph] was diminished because of the copyright violation.
Given the limited reproduction in question and the fact that the
September 1983 issue was off the newsstands by the time the
[Hustler] article was published in November, such a showing is
unlikely."252
The parody paradigm also distinguishes between merely ex-
ploitive attempts at parody and genuine satirical comment. 53 The
best articulation of this distinction can be found in Metro-Gold-
wyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions, Inc.
254
In Showcase, the district court held that "Scarlett Fever," a musi-
245. Id. at 758. See also D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F.
Supp. 110, 118 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (defendants stripping Superman "tarnishes the 'all-Ameri-
can' image that plaintiff has labored to create. .. ").
246. This reference is to sexual in the prurient sense, not the poems of Ovid.
247. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 1981). The court clearly indicated
that the show was lacking in artistic merit: "The producers, perhaps wisely, refrained from
seeking reviews by established theater critics." Id. at 181.





253. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956) (attempting to divide parodies
into satire and burlesque, the latter use not considered fair). Benny, often overanalyzed, has
been virtually overruled by subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Walt Disney Productions v. Air
Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1978).
254. 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
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cal version of "Gone With the Wind," was a commercial exploita-
tion, not a defensible parody. 55 In a well-reasoned opinion the
court clearly articulated the distinction between parody and come-
dic commercial exploitation, noting that
in order to constitute the type of parody eligible for fair use pro-
tection, parody must do more than merely achieve comedic ef-
fect. It must also make some critical comment or statement
about the original work which reflects the original perspective of
the parodist, thereby giving the parody social value beyond its
entertainment function.256
This distinction fits neatly into the parody paradigm because
it tends to differentiate between commercially exploitive uses
257
and genuine parody.15 This distinction was effectively wielded in a
subsequent case, New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music
Group.259 In Bertlesman the rap artist D.J. Jazzy Jeff made a mu-
sic video of his song entitled "A Nightmare on My Street," which
deliberately evoked the image of Freddy Krueger, the bizarrely
popular character of the "Nightmare on Elm Street" movies. 60
The court applied the Showcase test and found that the music
video was not entitled to the fair use defense.26'
The Court has serious doubts about whether the D.J. Jazzy Jeff
video constitutes a parody under this definition. The work does
not appear to make a critical comment or statement ... reflect-
ing a unique perspective. In fact, the video does not appear even
to be making fun of the movies themselves. Rather, the video
serves solely an entertainment and promotional function for [de-
fendant's] song.
2 2
But a genuine parody, even if used for profit, is still protected
255. Id. at 361.
256. Id. at 357.
257. See, e.g., D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110
(N.D. Ga. 1984) (finding Superstud and Wonderwench parodies to be unfair of plaintiff's
Superman and Wonderwoman characters).
258. See also Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) "When Sonny Sniffs Glue"
considered fair use parody if "When Sunny Gets Blue."
259. 693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
260. Id. at 1518.
261. Id. at 1525.
262. Id. at 1525. The court went on to assume that the video was a parody, and found
that it failed the four factor analysis under section 107. Id. at 1529. A similar result was
reached in Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(Comedian Joe Piscopo's exaggerated comedic version of the rap group Fat Boys was not a
fair use. The court applied Showcase analysis and concluded that "defendants' commercial
does not qualify as a parody. The commercial's use is entirely for profit: to sell beer.").
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as a fair use. In Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell,263 the Middle
District of Tennessee found that the rap group 2 Live Crew's par-
ody of the late Roy Orbison's song, "Oh Pretty Woman," was a
genuine parody entitled to the fair use defense. 264 "In sum, 2 Live
Crew is an anti-establishment rap group and this song derisively
demonstrates how bland and banal the Orbison song seems to
them. '265 The court also noted, "[I]n assessing the economic effect
of the parody, the parody's critical impact must be excluded.
Through its critical function, a 'parody may quite legitimately aim
at garroting the original, destroying it commercially as well as ar-
tistically. , '"26 If the producer of a work that parodies a copy-
righted work can demonstrate that it has a satiric purpose beyond
its mere entertainment value, does not utterly devastate the origi-
nal work's market value, and avoids prurient sexuality, it is virtu-
ally assured of being declared a fair use by the court.
D. Appropriation for Criticism or Historical Comment
Criticism, comment, and quotation for historical purposes are
all well recognized as fair uses. 26 7 The criticism/comment paradigm
focuses primarily on the substantiality of the work taken.66 Once a
colorable critical or historical purpose has been alleged, the fair use
defendant should focus on the amount and substantiality of the
copyright infringed. "Criticism, comment and review are well-rec-
ognized areas of fair use, even if profit is derived thereby. '269 With
the exception for unpublished works,270 the substantiality of the
taking will be the determinative factor.
In Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly,271 for example, the
court found that a copy of "Jesus Christ Superstar," made verba-
tim by Catholic priests, infringed the copyright of that work and
the fair use defense was unavailable. 7 2 "The defendants assert the
plaintiffs' production [the original, copyrighted work] 'clearly is an
unfavorable and offensive comment on the Passion and Death of
263. 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
264. Id. at 1154.
265. Id. at 1155.
266. Id. at 1158 (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1986)).
267. See supra text accompanying note 94.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 137-46 for an in-depth analysis of 17 U.S.C. §
107(3) (1988).
269. Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. 809, 812 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (fair use
of copies of commercial storyboards in order to comment on their effectiveness).
270. See infra text accompanying notes 299-318.
271. 346 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1972).
272. Id. at 384.
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Jesus, and is offensive to long-held Christian beliefs about
him.' ",217 The defendants argued that because they portrayed a
more virtuous Christ than did the original,274 "[their] performance
is within the scope of the fair use doctrine as a 'literary and reli-
gious criticism of the plaintiff's work.' "217 The court held simply
that "it seems crystal clear . . . that defendants' almost total copy-
ing of plaintiffs' work cannot possibly be considered a 'fair
use.' "276
In direct contrast is KarU v. Curtis Publishing Co.277 In Karll,
the court found that the reproduction of the words to the Green
Bay Packer fight song could be quoted in a history of the football
franchise.2 78 "When the [the holder of the song's copyright] dedi-
cated the song to the Green Bay Packers, by implication at least he
consented to a reasonable use thereof associated with the
Packers.
'27 9
The line between substantial taking, which is an unfair use,
and reasonable appropriation, a fair use, is difficult to draw2 0 and
has resulted in contrasting opinions. For example, in striking a fair
use defense, one court found that the plaintiff's diary, which he
kept while serving as an ambassador for the Shah of Iran, could
not be elsewhere reproduced in its entirety.281 "A virtual wholesale
lifting of extensive excerpts from plaintiff's book quoted in another
authorized serialization cannot be considered reasonable as a mat-
ter of law.
'28 2
If the copyrighted item represents a novel or unique historical
273. Id. (quotifig, apparently, defendant's brief).
274. Id.
275. 346 F. Supp. 376, 384.
276. Id.
277. 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
278. Id. at 836-37.
279. Id. at 837. See also Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Publishing Corp., 31 F. Supp.
87 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (court found copy of lyrics to Perils of Pauline could be utilized in con-
nection with Pearl White's epitaph.) But see Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F.
Supp. 921 (S.D. Ca. 1963).
280. Compare Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
with Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (excerpts from Stravinsky's
personal letters). In finding against the fair use defense, the Time Inc. court held "Kobler's
takings are far too numerous and with too little instructional justification to support the
conclusion of fair use. . . the appropriations constitute approximately 3% of the volume of
Kobler's book. The importance of these passages to the book far exceeds that percentage.
* . . I think Kobler might agree that they are the liveliest and most entertaining part of the
biography." Id. at 129.
281. Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1985).
282. Id. at 1303. See Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.
.1984) (finding it was a fair use to publish edited version of lawyer's letter to editor).
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property, then a significantly broader scope of fair use defense is
available.8 ' To date, only a single case has met the requirements
for this broader scope of fair use.2"4 When Abraham Zapruder set
up his camera in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963, he did not
realize that the home movies he took would be of the assassination
of John F. Kennedy.285 Zapruder copyrighted the film, gave two
copies to the government and sold still photos to Life magazine.
286
The author of a book, entitled Six Seconds in Dallas, utilized
charcoal reproductions of certain frames from Zapruder's film
which had been published in Life.287 Despite the defendant's color-
able bad faith, the court found "a public interest in having the
fullest information available on the murder of President Ken-
nedy.288 [The defendant] did serious work on the subject and has a
theory entitled to public consideration."28 " This case, however, is
an anomaly. A practitioner attempting to craft a fair use defense
within the contours of the criticism/comment paradigm should em-
phasize the insubstantial amount of the work taken and, if possi-
ble, some educational or historical value derived from the use.
In Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell,290 the Second Circuit held
that a Catholic priest's extensive quotation from a copyrighted
prochoice book in drafting his own anti-abortion work was a fair
use.291 "One need not agree with the merit, methodology or conclu-
sions of [the defendant's book] to recognize that [the priest] ap-
plied substantial intellectual labor to the verbatim quotations, con-
tinually offering his own insights and opinions. '292 The court ruled
in favor of the priest, holding that the use of plaintiff's work "was
precisely the type of criticism of or comment on copyrighted
materials anticipated by [s]ection 107. ' '293
283. The property itself must be unique and not simply evoke a unique character. See
Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
afl'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) (court rejected Columbia Broadcasting's claim that ex-
pulsion in the 1950's made copyrighted films historical work).
284. Time Inc., 293 F. Supp. at 130.
285. Id. at 131.
286. Id. at 133-34.
287. Id. at 135.
288. Id. at 146. ("There is an initial reluctance to find any fair use by defendants
because of the conduct of [the defendant] in making his copies and because of the deliberate
appropriation in the book, in defiance of the copyright owner.")
289. Id.
290. 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986).
291. Id. at 1265.
292. Id. at 1260.
293. Id. at 1265. (The court also weighed into the calculus the fact that plaintiff's book
had been out of print for over ten years, making any claim for future market damage too
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One element of the criticism/comment paradigm that deserves
special attention is the unique status enjoyed by unpublished let-
ters and documents.29 4 There is considerable conflict over whether,
and to what extent, fair use can be made of unpublished letters
and writings during the creation of a biography or historical work.
The debate has raged on particularly through the Second Circuit
29 5
and the law reviews.296 Fortunately for the practitioner, the appli-
cation of fair use doctrine to unpublished letters and documents is
relatively easy. A work that utilizes quotations from previojusly
published materials will customarily be declared a fair use pro-
vided the quotation is reasonable as to quantity.
2 7
In Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,2 98 the Second Circuit
barred publication of a biography containing quotations from un-
published letters of the reclusive author, J.D. Salinger.299 Despite
the fact that Hamilton, the biographer, obtained copies of Salin-
ger's letters from several library archives, the court remanded the
case with directions to issue an injunction against publication. 00
The court found unavailing Hamilton's argument that the quota-
tions need be used to evoke Salinger's ironic literary style.30' "To
deny a biographer. . . the opportunity to copy the expressive con-
tent of unpublished letters is not, as appellees contend, to interfere
in any significant way with the process of enhancing public knowl-
edge of history or contemporary events. The facts may be re-
ported. 3 0 2 But "Salinger has a right to protect the expressive con-
speculative.)
294. This question arises almost exclusively in biography cases, in which the plaintiff
seeks to reduce public exposure to personal letters and other information. See, e.g., Love v.
Kwitny, 706 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
295. See, e.g., New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt and Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), afl'd on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 884 F.2d 659
(2d Cir. 1989). See also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
296. See debate between Judge Leval and Professor Weinreb, supra note 2. See also
NIMMER, supra note 1; NEWMAN, supra note 1.
297. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d
Cir. 1966). Rosemont held that extensive quotations from published works about Howard
Hughes were fair use. Id. at 305. The court noted that "it is both reasonable and customary
for biographers to refer to and utilize earlier works dealing with the subject of the work and
occasionally to quote directly from such works." Id. at 307. Accord Meeropol v. Nizer, 560
F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977) (fair use to quote from letters written by Rosenberg which were
later published).
298. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
299. Id. at 100.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 96-97.
302. Id. at 100.
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tent of his unpublished writings for the term of his copyright, and
that right prevails over a claim of fair use under 'ordinary
circumstances.' "o303
The Scientology movement has also contributed to the juris-
prudence of fair use.304 In a pair of cases involving erstwhile biog-
raphies of the founder of Scientology, the Second Circuit upheld
the distinction between quotation of published mate-
rial-considered fair-and quotation of unpublished mate-
rial-presumptively unfair.3 05 In both Henry Holt and Carol Pub-
lishing, New Era sought to prevent publication of biographies of L.
Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Dianetics movement.306 Both
works sought to expose Hubbard as little more than a hack pulp
writer turned prophetic savior, a fraud, and pathological liar. 30 7 In
Carol Publishing, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's
finding of fair use because the author quoted directly from only a
small portion of Hubbard's previously published work.30 8
Henry Holt can be divided into two parts, because the biogra-
pher in that case drew extensively from Hubbard's published
works as well as his unpublished efforts.30 9 Reproduction of the
published works was a fair use. "Neither appellant nor the major-
ity opinion disputes Judge Leval's conclusion about Hubbard's
published works: that all the quotations or paraphrases from these
works were either non-infringing or fairly used ... ."310 The quota-
tions from Hubbard's unpublished works, however, could not be
utilized.31
303. Id. (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539,
555 (1985)).
304. See infra text accompanying notes 306-12.
305. New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), reh'g
denied, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989); New Era Publications Int'l v. Carol Publishing Group,
904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990).
306. In Carol Publishing, 904 F.2d at 153, the book was entitled A Piece of Blue Sky:
Scientology, Dianetics and L. Ron Hubbard Exposed, and in Henry Holt, 873 F.2d 576 (2d
Cir. 1989), the title was Bare-Faced Messiah: The True Story of L. Ron Hubbard.
307. The best discussion of this can be found in the lower court Henry Holt opinion,
695 F. Supp. at 1508-24.
308. 904 F.2d at 159.
309. 695 F. Supp. at 1498.
310. 873 F.2d at 591 (Oakes, J., concurring).
311. 873 F.2d at 584. Judge Leval's opinion offers some helpful language which is good
law:
This means that a biographer/critic who purports to make fair use of unpub-
lished copyrighted matter must make a particularly compelling demonstration of
justification, upon full consideration of the relevant fair use factors. She must
show that her use of protected expression is not done simply to enliven her text
by appropriating her subject's lively expression. The use of the protected expres-
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A recent case out of the Southern District of New York put a
new spin on Salinger3 12 Wright v. Warner Books, Inc.313 deviated
from Salinger when it allowed a biographer to quote from the un-
published letters of the novelist Richard Wright.3 14 The court dis-
tinguished Salinger in two ways: 1) Wright no longer had the same
privacy interest as Salinger;316 and 2) unlike Salinger's letters, the
Wright materials had been "sold to Yale University's Beinecke Li-
brary for a considerable sum."316 According to the court, this
meant that it was "reasonable to conclude that for the purchase
price, and pursuant to the sales contract, the University became
free to share Wright's work with interested scholars."317
In sum, the critical focus in the criticism/comment paradigm
is the amount and substantiality of the infringement, and as long
as the taking is reasonable the use will be fair, even if the use is
profitable. The primary exception to the above rule is that unpub-
lished works enjoy a virtual per se protection that greatly restricts
the duplication of such works.318
E. Exploitation of Factual Compilations or Data Bases
Along with the commercial exploitation paradigm,319 the fac-
tual compilation paradigm will only rarely be deemed a fair use.320
A factual compilation is any form of factual data published in or-
der to provide information to a large audience. For example, the
racing form, the phone book, or other type of data base are all
factual complications. Unlike commercial exploitation, where good
faith and appropriation of the copyright holder's market are cen-
tral, the factual complication paradigm has evolved its own unique
set of principles.321
sion must be reasonably necessary to the communication and demonstration of
significant points being made about the subject and must have no significant
adverse effect on the market for the copyrighted work.
695 F. Supp. at 1504.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 299-304.
313. 748 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
314. Id. at 113.
315. Id. This is particularly startling because in Henry Holt, 873 F.2d at 583, the court
of appeals gave little attention to the fact that L. Ron Hubbard was dead.
316. 748 F. Supp. at 110 (emphasis in original).
317. Id.
318. This area of law will continue to be in flux for some time since the unpublished
writings of an individual are critical to a biographer's work.
319. See infra text accompanying notes 345-94.
320. Often, discussions involving factual complications center around 17 U.S.C. §
107(2), the nature element.
321. The archetype of this paradigm is the phone book case, in which the defendant
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Reproductions of factual compilations are fair only if the
copyrighted work is used as an independent source to check or
confirm data,322 or if the use is completely distinct from the copy-
righted work. 323 The Seventh Circuit defined the paradigm as fol-
lows: "It is recognized that a compiler of a directory or the like
may make a fair use of an existing compilation serving the same
purpose if he first makes an honest, independent canvas; he merely
compares and checks his own compilation with that of the copy-
righted publication .... ,,324 This holding is common to all the
jurisdictions. 532
In cases involving factual compilations, defendants frequently
argue that their use of the copyrighted information serves a pur-
pose distinct from that of the holders of the copyright. 26 This legal
argument usually fails. For example, in Chain Store Business
Guide, Inc. v. Wexler,3217 a mailing list business took a marketing
directory, copied the names, and created a mailing list.3  The de-
fendant argued that the use should be fair as long as it copied the
information but not the format of the original.32 9 The court dis-
agreed.330 Similarly, in Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England
Newspaper Publishing Co.,331 creating narratives out of statistical
race results was not a fair use . 3 2 The acquisition of computer data
has copied factual information. See, e.g., Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91
F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
322. See, e.g., Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Telephone Directory Pub-
lishers, 756 F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1985).
323. See, e.g., New York Times, Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217
(D.N.J. 1977).
324. G.R. Leonard & Co. v. Stack, 386 F.2d 38, 39 (7th Cir. 1967). Another court com-
pletely ruled out fair use in these circumstances. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines and Co., 683
F. Supp. 1204, 1210 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("When a defendant fails to start with his own indepen-
dent canvass and instead starts with plaintiff's copyrighted information ... this defense is
unavailable.").
325. See Southwestern Bell Media, Inc. v. Trans Western Publishing, Inc., 670 F.
Supp. 899 (D. Kan. 1987). See also Northwestern Tel. Systems, Inc. v. Local Publications,
Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. 257, 258 (D. Mon. 1979) ("[A] compiler of a directory may make a fair use
of an existing compilation serving the same purpose if he first makes an honest, indepen-
dent canvass .. ").
326. See, e.g., Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Systems, Inc., 600 F. Supp.
933 (N.D. Ill 1984) (unfair use to take mileage data from printed map and input into com-
puterized data base.).
327. 79 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
328. Id. at 727.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 728.
331. 46 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1942).
332. Id. at 199.
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bases also violates fair use."'
Even an independent canvas does not allow for appropriation
of financial analysis of data. In Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall
Street Transcript Corp.,33 4 for example, the court found that Wall
Street Transcripts "appropriated almost verbatim the most crea-
tive and original aspects of the reports, the financial analysis and
predictions, which represent a substantial investment of time,
money and labor.
'3 35
Nor can industry practices represent a valid defense. In Bell-
South Advertising and Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information
Publishing, Inc.,3 36 the defendant sought to prove fair use by dem-
onstrating that the practice in the industry was to take existing
works .33 The court stated:
Donnelley alleges that 'keying' (obtaining a copy of the local di-
rectory and placing the business listing information of name, ad-
dress, telephone numbers, and business classification from that
directory into a computer data base) is a standard industry
practice among competitive directory publishers. Donnelley's
claim is analogous to that of a driver stopped for speeding. The
driver may claim that everybody drives over fifty-five and it is
unfair to stop him. Just as widespread abuse of speed limits is
irrelevant to the crime of speeding, industrial piracy of directo-
ries, even if widespread should not be probative of whether such
piracy is fair use
s.33
If the alleged infringer can demonstrate a use which is totally
dissimilar in nature, such a use might be fair. In N.A.D.A. Services
Corp. v. Business Data of Virginia, Inc.,339 the court considered
the copying of automobile prices from plaintiff's guide to prepare
pricing guides for tax assessors to be a fair use.3 40 The use was
considered fair because the enjoying of BDV's business would not,
in any way, profit N.A.D.A.341
333. See Telerate Systems, Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (presump-
tion of unfair use when defendant is drawing financial information from plaintiff's wire).
See also National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ill
1982).
334. 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977).
335. Id. at 96 (footnotes omitted.).
336. 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
337. Id. at 1556.
338. Id. at 1561. See also United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d
604 (8th Cir. 1988) (20% of phone book copied was unfair use.)
339. 651 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Va. 1986).
340. Id. at 46.
341. Id. at 48. See' also New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F.
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With a few notable exceptions, namely, the use of compilation
as a confirming source, 342 compilations of data may not be mined
for their value under the aegis of fair use. In this regard, they are
similar to the cases involving appropriation for commercial
exploitation.3 14
F. Appropriation for Commercial Exploitation
Commercial exploitation is any attempt to utilize another's
copyright for gain, pecuniary or otherwise. 44 The two crucial ele-
ments in this paradigm are the amount of damage done to a copy-
right holder's market, 4 5 and the good or bad faith of the alleged
infringer, both of which the courts examine more critically than in
any other paradigm. 46 This paradigm analyzes the broad base of
copyright uses which are done for profit, and which cannot cloak
themselves in the protective garb of historical comment 4? or of
parody.3 48 Most uses which fall into the commercial exploitation
paradigm are little more than economic piracy.31 For example, in a
case where a builder copied the architect's plans, dismissed the ar-
chitect, and constructed the building according to the same
plans,5 0 the court dismissed the builder's fair use defense, noting
Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 1977) (creation of short name index to the New York Times was fair use).
Roxbury is troublesome because of the courts inability to find any damage to the New York
Time's market for a similar product.
342. See supra note 323.
343. See infra text accompanying notes 345-94.
344. See, e.g., Weismann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989) (gain through aca-
demic prestige and notice).
345. This can go from total appropriation, see, e.g., WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ Enterprises,
584 F. Supp. 132 (D.C.D.C. 1984) (defendant completely copied plaintiff's application to the
FCC for new radio station). The Court found no fair use to a beneficial exposure for the
copyrighted work, Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, 626 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1986) (Ha-
berman's sales increased after exposure in Hustler magazine. The use was adjudged fair.).
346. Compare Iowa State Univ. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d
Cir. 1980) (ABC sports broadcasted segments of plaintiffs film and then denied doing so. In
finding against fair use, the court declared that the "fair use doctrine is not a license for
corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore a copyright whenever it determines the under-
lying work material of possible public importance.") with Matthews Conveyor Co. v.
Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943) (affirming fair use of defendant's drawing from
photograph of common products). See also Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. 580, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) (CBS
used copies of Chaplin films unfairly.).
347. See supra text accompanying notes 267-90.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 227-67.
349. See, e.g., Trebonik v. Grossman Music Corp., 305 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ohio 1969)
(Defendant completely copied plaintiff's elaborate system for teaching guitar cords. Court
found fair use defense did not apply.).
350. Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Etc. v. Empire Construction Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D.
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that the Belmont appropriation "destroyed plaintiff's potential
market."
3 51
Similarly, bad faith colored the efforts by MPI Home video to
sell copies made of Jessee Jackson's speech at the National Demo-
cratic Convention.3 5 2 MPI made several thousand copies of the
Jackson speech and distributed them in less than a week.3 53 Not
only did the defendant destroy the market, he also engaged in a
bad faith race to get his tape out to capture' the market.354
The same implicit recognition of bad faith actions by the in-
fringer can be found in Whitol v. Crow.3 55 In Whitol, a choral di-
rector copied the plaintiff's song, added several bars, and then of-
fered to sell his new arrangement back to the plaintiff.3 56 The
director's rearrangement and redistribution with only his name as
composer, infringed plaintiff's copyright rights.
3 57
The effect of the infringement is the single most determinative
factor in finding a potential fair use in this paradigm.35 s Perhaps
the most obvious violation of a, copyrighted song, occurred at the
Arizona State Fair.3 59 The state infringed the plaintiff's copyright
by playing his song, "Happiness Is," over four thousand times.
3 60
The court found in plaintiff's favor, noting that "defendant's tak-
ing of plaintiff's right was total, every right contemplated by the
copyright statute. This sort of activity is a long way from the quo-
tation of an excerpt for the purpose of literary comment.
Neb. 1982).
351. Id. at 260. See also Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Service Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. 170
(W.D. Tex 1983) (Use of previous plan in creation of shopping center was not fair.).
352. Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694 F. Supp. 483, 485 (N.D. Ill. 1988). See generally
Kevane, supra note 1, at 595.
353. Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 484-85.
354. Id. at 490. The court rejected defendant's argument that this activity was news
reporting, concluding that this case was clear and simple commercial exploitation. See also
Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 505 F.2d 1250
(7th Cir. 1974).
355. 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).
356. Id. at 779.
357. Id. at 780. See Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Bedco. of Minnesota, Inc., 501 F.
Supp. 299, 303 (D. Minn. 1980) (denying fair use defense to publisher of yellow pages who
made photocopies of advertisements in competing company's directories and offered to pub-
lish exact duplicates). See also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers,
Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The use of
a copyrighted work by a commercial enterprise for commercial advantage was not the pri-
mary concern in the development of the fair use doctrine.").
358. Contrast this with parody, where the infringer intentionally destroys a copy-
righted item's market. See supra text accompanying note 266.
359. Mills Music, Inc. v. State of Ariz., 187 U.S.P.Q. 22 (D. Ariz. 1975).
360. Id. at 25.
361. Id. at 37. See also Hill v. Whalen & Martell, 290 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (new
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In the commercial exploitation paradigm, if the alleged infringer's
use merely competes or diminishes the copyright holder's direct
market, a finding of fair use is unlikely."6 2 For example, in Update
Art, Inc. v. Maariv Israel Newspaper, Inc.,3 63 an Israeli newspaper
copied art from the plaintiff.3 64 In finding against fair use, the
court found that the "full page copy of [the art work] in defend-
ants' newspaper and plaintiff's original, however, are in direct com-
petition with each other as posters. Under these circumstances, de-
fendants' actions can be seen as affecting the market for plaintiff's
product.
'3 16 5
Another form of appropriation is a naked exploitation, which
exploits a copyright through a transforming use. 66 For example,
where the defendant made plastic busts of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. and placed copyrighted quotes on the busts, 67 the court
decided: "Defendants have copied the actual copyrighted material
for no purpose but their own financial gain. Defendants' use of
substantial passages from Dr. King's creative works was purely to
induce consumers to buy the plastic busts and to convey the im-
pression that the Center approved of the product.
'368
Additionally, in Horn Abott Ltd. v. Sarsaparilla Ltd.,69 the
manufacturer of the Trivial Pursuit board game obtained an in-
junction against a book publisher who sought to publish a book
with all of the questions and answers from the game.3 70 The plain-
tiffs argued, and the court agreed, that the use was unfair "because
it has stolen the essence of the game, all of the questions and
answers."
3 71
comic strip "Nutt and Giff" impinged market for "Mutt and Jeff" cartoons).
362. See, e.g., Schymann v. Albuquerque Corp., 664 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.M. 1987) (radio
broadcast songs of band during spot pickup was considered unfair use). See also Associated
Music Publishers v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1944).
363. 635 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming only
extraterritorial application of copyright law and damages).
364. Id. at 229.
365. Id. at 232. See also Pacific and Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir.
1984) (defendant unfairly infringed copyright when he videotaped news broadcasts and sold
them to subject of the news reports); New Boston Television, Inc. v. Entertainment Sports
Programming Network, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 755 (D. Mass. 1981) (finding unfair ESPN's use of
film highlights in violation of plaintiff's copyright).
366. See, e.g., Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1980) (transforming
in the sense that the infringing use is of a different type than the originally held copyright).
367. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change v. American Heritage, Inc., 508
F. Supp. 854, 856 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
368. Id. at 861.
369. 601 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
370. Id. at 362.
371. Id. at 367. See also Publications Int'l Ltd. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 215 U.S.P.Q. 861
[Vol. 9:121
40
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 4
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol9/iss1/4
ANALYZING FAIR USE CLAIMS
The transforming use will never be considered fair if it demol-
ishes the value of the copyright. For example, in Educational Test-
ing Services v. Katzman,72 the court found that Princeton Re-
view's use of SAT questions infringed ETS' copyright.3 73 While the
court agreed that the "Review. . . is not in competition with ETS,
use of ETS' materials by the Review renders the materials worth-
less to ETS.''374 Similarly, in Association of American Medical
Colleges v. Mikaelian,7 5 the court found that inclusion of prior.
copyrighted questions in a study aid harmed the copyright holder
and consequently represented an unfair use.
3 76
Rarely will a commercially exploitive use be found to- be
fair. 3 77 However, when the use is radically different and in good
faith, it may be adjudged fair. In Rokeach v. Avco Embassy Pic-
tures Corp., 78 the plaintiff, a scientist, had written and copy-
righted a case study entitled The Three Christs of Ypsilanti,
which analyzed three mental patients who believed themselves to
be Jesus Christ. 9 Defendants produced, wrote, and directed a
comedy called "The Ruling Class" about delusional Christs con-
fronting each other.3 80 Defendant utilized quotes from The Three
Christs in authoring the play.381 The court found that the fact that
the "motion picture and play are commercial ventures does not vi-
olate the artistic merits of the production nor bar the author from
using the materials in this manner. The Three Christs is quite
(N.D. Ill). But see Universal City Studios v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
372. 793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986).
373. Id. at 543.
374. Id.
375. 571 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
376. Id. at 152. See also Meridith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 500 F.2d
1221 (2d Cir. 1974); Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y.
1963) (solutions manual for copyrighted textbook was unfair use).
377. See, e.g., Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 245 F. Supp. 587
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (plaintiff's puppets were used on Captain Kangaroo show). In finding the
use fair the court noted:
Commentators agree that among the most important factors bearing on whether
a use is a fair one, perhaps the most important, is whether the use tends to
interfere with the sale of copyrighted article. Here, if anything, the exhibition on
television would stimulate sales of the hand-puppets rather than prejudice them.
Further, the 'copies' complained of here could not be used as a substitute for the
original work. In addition, these hand puppets were not the principal attraction
on the television programs. Rather, their use was incidental.
Id. at 590 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
378. 197 U.S.P.Q. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
379. Id. at 156-57.
380. Id. at 157.
381. Id. at 160-61.
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plainly the report of a scientific case study, bearing no resemblance
to the baroque satire dramatized in 'The Ruling Class.' "382
As noted previously,38 3 the two defining elements of the com-
mercial exploitation paradigm are good faith and effect on the
market. To prevail in this paradigm, it is beneficial to show a posi-
tive effect on the market. In both Haberman v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc3 84 and Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,38 5 Hustler published
copies of plaintiffs' artwork."' 8 The courts, however, reached oppo-
site results. 387 The distinction can be found in the proof of dam-
ages at trial. In Brewer, the court decided that "[s]ince the use was
of a commercial nature, harm to Brewer could be presumed. 388
The Haberman court, however, reached the opposite result, hold-
ing the use fair because the sales of plaintiff's copyrighted work
went up after the reproduction in Hustler.
38 9
Similarly, the existence of bad faith is fatal to a fair use claim
in this paradigm.39 ° In two separate cases, Consumer Reports
sought to prevent publication of their review of a certain prod-
uct.39 1 The court found publication in an advertisement to be a fair
use where the claim was accurate. 92 Where the claim was inaccu-
rate, fair use was not applicable.393 When a party seeks gain
through appropriation of a copyrighted work, and cannot cloak its
use in a manner to suggest a public benefit, the use will be deemed
per se unfair and subject to critical scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSION
The six factual paradigms outlined above represent a new ap-
proach to untangling the Gordian knot of the fair use doctrine for
the practitioner. While the lawyer still must fashion arguments
382. Id. at 161. See also Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989) (fair use for
defendant to mix part of historical work into pulp novel in order to create antibellum
perspective).
383. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
384. 626 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1986).
385. 749 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984).
386. Haberman, 626 F. Supp. at 203; Brewer, 749 F.2d at 529.
387. See Haberman, 626 F. Supp. at 206 (finding fair use); Brewer, 749 F.2d at 529
(not finding fair use).
388. 749 F.2d at 529.
389. 626 F. Supp. at 206.
390. Bad faith is copying after being denied permission.
391. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 431 F.
Supp. 324 (N.D. Iowa 1977); Consumers Union of United States, Inc., v. General Signal
Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 730 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1984).
392. 724 F.2d at 1049.
393. 431 F. Supp. at 326.
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about each of the four statutory factors, 4 these factual paradigms
may provide guidance about which elements to emphasize or at-
tack in support a fair use claim.
394. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1-4) (1988).
1992]
43
Wallace: Analyzing Fair Use Claims: A Quantitative and Paradigmatic Approa
Published by Institutional Repository, 1992
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX
Quantitative analysis is, at best, an inexact science, and pro-
vides, at most, inferential elements of trends or aspects of the deci-
sion making process. In the drafting of this study, practical limits
affected the sample size and available cases. A computer search
found 349 cases which utilized the terms "copyright" and "fair
use." After culling the cases that did not reach the issue or did not
provide a final resolution, I used the remainder as a sample base.
In researching this sample, I sought only the final decision of a
court on the fair use issue. This eliminated prior, reversed or af-
firmed, opinions. Each of the cases in the sample were analyzed for
procedural posture, and the existence of a list of binomial (yes/no)
variables. The categories included: commercial purpose, charitable/
nonprofit Educational biographical, historical, and informational,
critical claims by the alleged infringer as well as the existence of
First Amendment, substantiality of taking, and impact on the
market.
Most of all the useful information produced by this matrix is
discussed in the proceeding text. Chronological analysis, both
before and after the 1976 codification, reveal no discernable trend
or pattern. Geographically, the Second Circuit handles the over-
whelming number of claims. The percentage of cases handled by
each circuit are illustrated below.













All of the numbers have been rounded off to a significant digit.
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